Dog Sniff Drug Dog Oxycodone Trafficking Conviction Reversed

Drugs (Oxycodone)  suppressed when officer detained driver to wait for drug dog on seatbelt ticket.

Appellant Dravien Jones appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle during a traffic stop.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), we agree with Appellant that the search occurred during an illegal detention.  We therefore reverse his conviction.  

Supreme Court cases have held that a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission” of issuing a ticket,

Background 

 An officer of the Sebastian Police Department stopped Appellant after observing that he was driving his vehicle without wearing a seatbelt.  During the stop, Appellant provided the officer with his driver’s license and admitted to the officer his seatbelt was broken.  The officer testified that Appellant “appeared excessively nervous” during the stop and that the address on Appellant’s license may have been incorrect.  Based on these observations, the officer sought permission to search Appellant’s vehicle.  Appellant refused to grant such permission.      

 The officer instructed Appellant to exit the vehicle and conducted a dog sniff of the vehicle.  The dog alerted during the sniff, which led the officer to search the vehicle and find approximately twenty oxycodone tablets.  The officer estimated approximately three minutes elapsed between the beginning of the traffic stop and the dog sniff.  The officer stated that although Appellant provided him with his driver’s license, the officer never did anything with the license.  Similarly, the officer never wrote a citation for a seatbelt violation, nor did he begin writing such a ticket. 

"In this case, the officer abandoned his reason for the traffic stop (writing the seatbelt citation) and instead chose to conduct the sniff of Defendant’s vehicle.  Once the officer decided against writing the citation, the purpose for the stop was complete and the justification for the stop was no longer valid."

  Appellant was charged with trafficking oxycodone.  He moved to suppress the discovery of the oxycodone, alleging the officer’s search of his vehicle was unconstitutional.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that although the officer lacked “articulable suspicion of criminal activity” prior to the search, the stop was not prolonged by the sniff, as it occurred within the time it would have taken to write a citation.  Appellant entered a plea of no contest and expressly reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his dispositive motion to suppress evidence incident to the search.  He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to a three-year mandatory minimum sentence in prison. 

Analysis 

 “The standard of review applicable to a motion to suppress evidence requires that this Court defer to the trial court’s factual findings but review legal conclusions de novo.”  Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 

 The Supreme Court recently addressed the acceptable scope of detentions with regards to dog sniffs in Rodriguez.  The Court held that “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [Illinois v.] Caballes, 543 U.S. [405,] 407 [(2005),] and attend to related safety concerns.”  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.  “Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)).  The officer’s “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”  Id.  When determining the reasonable time to complete the required tasks, the court must also consider the “whether the police diligently pursue their investigation.”  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).  

Prior Supreme Court cases have held that a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a ticket, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, and that a seizure is lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).  Rodriguez, however, eliminates any ambiguity about the reasonableness of the time required for the officer to complete a traffic stop.  As the Court made clear, “[i]f an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.’”  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (second alteration in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).  “The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’”  Id.  

In this case, the officer abandoned his reason for the traffic stop (writing the seatbelt citation) and instead chose to conduct the sniff of Defendant’s vehicle.  Once the officer decided against writing the citation, the purpose for the stop was complete and the justification for the stop was no longer valid.  See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. (“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”).  Because the officer no longer had any valid reason to detain Appellant, the search of Appellant’s vehicle was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and, as such, the evidence found as a result of the search should have been suppressed. 

This is not to say that officers can never conduct dog sniffs during routine traffic stops.  A sniff is still permitted so long as, in the absence of an articulable suspicion of criminal activity prior to the search, it does not extend the time it takes the detaining officer to complete the tasks which justified the detention.  For instance, the Supreme Court found the dog sniff search constitutional in Caballes:  “While [the officer who had initiated the traffic stop] was in the process of writing a warning ticket, [the second officer who had arrived on the scene] walked his dog around [the defendant’s] car.”  Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406. 

The State argues the officer’s failure to write a seatbelt citation in this case is not relevant to the constitutional analysis and likens this case to Finizio v. State, 800 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  That case is distinguishable.  In Finizio, the detaining officer stopped a driver for driving erratically.  Id. at 348.  While talking with the driver, the officer smelled alcohol and began a DUI investigation that ultimately led to the discovery of cocaine in the driver’s pocket.  Id.  Unlike the actions taken by the officer in Finizio, a dog sniff is not part of a normal traffic stop, Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, and in this case, the officer’s routine traffic stop failed to 

produce any evidence of another crime that would justify the search of Appellant’s vehicle.  Furthermore, even if Finizio were not distinguishable, our precedent from 2001 cannot override the United States Supreme Court’s holding from just last year. 

Conclusion 

We agree with the trial court that, prior to the canine search at issue, the officer had no “articulable suspicion of criminal activity” on the part of Appellant.  Thus, the officer had no legal authority to detain Appellant outside the limited purpose provided by the traffic violation.  Once the officer abandoned this line of inquiry, the justification for the stop had expired and Appellant was free to leave.  The dog sniff, therefore, prolonged the stop in violation of Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  The evidence obtained as a direct result of the sniff should have been suppressed.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court to dismiss the charges against Appellant. 

 Reversed. 

STEVENSON and MAY, JJ., concur. 

*            *            * 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

Complete Opinion of 

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

FOURTH DISTRICT 

DRAVIEN JERROD JONES, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

No. 4D15-639 

[March 9, 2016] 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Robert L. Pegg, Judge; L.T. Case No. 312013CF000901A. 

Kai Li Aloe Fouts of Eisenberg & Fouts, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. 

FORST, J. 

    

Methamphetamine Case Tossed - Open Door and the Community Caretaker Function

Warrantless entry
Medical Emergency
Community Caretaker

What Happens When Police Make a Warrantless Entry of a Home for Medical Emergency?

Treasure Island, Florida has become a hotbed of the methamphetamine world. So while on patrol, a cop saw an open door with mail on the floor near the mail slot. The decision was made to enter the home and make sure everyone was alright. Of course, while there, why not search the house and find some meth. Court says adios to this one. 

Given Central Florida's temperate weather in November, an open door at 8:00 in the morning, without more, cannot justify a warrantless entry based on a feared medical emergency or the community caretaker function.  

What happens when police make a warrantless entry of a motor vehicle?

Attorneys Note: Traffic cops use the community caretaker function to justify DUI arrests of drivers that are found sleeping in a parked car. In Florida, this is known as a DUI Actual Physical Control. You can see how a Florida Court addresses the seizure of a sleeping motorist.  Sometimes the opening of a door of a sleeping driver is handled the same way the court handled this Treasure Island case where the charges are thrown out after a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress is granted.

Complete Text of Methamphetamine, Warrantless Entry, Medical Emergency, Community Caretaker Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

Case No. 2D14-5582

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.        

JOHN FULTZ

Appellee.

                       

Opinion filed January 22, 2016.                 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Chris Helinger, Judge.                   

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.                   

J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

SLEET, Judge.

The State appeals the order granting John Fultz's motion to suppress evidence in his criminal prosecution for possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver methamphetamine. In this case, we are called on to determine whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for a feared medical emergency or performance of a community caretaking function justified the warrantless entry and search of Fultz's home.  Because the police had no objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an emergency inside Fultz's residence to justify a warrantless search, we affirm.

Officer Lovelace, a patrol officer for the Treasure Island Police Department, was in the area of Fultz's townhouse at around 7:45 a.m. on November 26, 2013, where she had just completed a "house check" on a nearby home.¹ Officer Lovelace testified that she had been previously contacted by a citizen who had been keeping traffic logs for Fultz's townhouse due to "suspicious foot traffic." Two weeks prior to the search at issue, Officer Hansell, a St. Petersburg police officer who lived in the area, told Officer Lovelace that he suspected there was drug activity at the townhouse. Further raising her suspicions, when Officer Lovelace reported for her shift roll call that morning, Patrol Sergeant DeShay informed her of unconfirmed information he received from an informant regarding a possible meth lab in the garage of the townhouse.

After conducting the requested house check, Officer Lovelace decided to drive by Fultz's townhouse, which she suspected contained a meth lab. As she was passing by, she noticed that the front door to the townhouse was open, a light was on upstairs, some mail was on the floor under the mail slot, the garage door was closed, and a car was parked in the driveway. Officer Lovelace testified that based on her suspicion of drug activity, she called for backup about a minute after observing the open door.

¹Officer Lovelace testified that the residents of the home were out of town and had requested that Treasure Island police check in on their home, a service that Officer Lovelace routinely provides as a part of her patrol.

Sergeant DeShay and Officer Smallen arrived on the scene ten minutes later.  Before proceeding any further, DeShay contacted Detective Taylor in the Treasure Island police drug division and informed him of the situation, but Taylor declined to join them at the scene.  Notwithstanding, based on the open door, mail, and unconfirmed reports of drug activity, the three officers decided to enter the home to conduct a "welfare check" on the residents.  Sergeant DeShay testified that he knocked on the open door, announced "police," and then entered the residence. He immediately opened the door leading into the garage and discovered signs of an active meth lab. The trial court ultimately suppressed this evidence, and this appeal ensued.

A warrantless search of a home is "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . and Article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v. Boyd, 615 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (quoting Cross v. State, 469 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA1985)); see also Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006). Exigent circumstances are one such exception that may justify a warrantless search, but the police must have an objectively reasonable basis to support their actions. Vanslyke v. State, 936 So. 2d 1218, 1221-22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547

U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see also Boyd, 615 So. 2d at 789 ("[T]o allow a warrantless entry into a person's home in an emergency situation, there must be objectively reasonable circumstances that convey to the police officer an articulable, reasonable belief that an emergency exists.").

The exigent circumstances exception is not a shortcut by which police may circumvent the requirement of a search warrant.  These exceptions are based on a police officer's ability to articulate objective facts which make the procuring of a warrant impractical. See Davis v. State, 834 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("The sine qua non of the exigent circumstances exception is 'a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.' " (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978))). "[I]f time to get a warrant exists, the enforcement agency must use that time to obtain the warrant."  Herring v. State, 168 So. 3d 240, 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), review dismissed, 173 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1977)).

In this case, the State contends that the police were justified in entering Fultz's townhouse because they reasonably believed that the open door and scattered mail portended an emergency. Specifically, the State argues that two particular types of exigencies justified the police action in this case: the community caretaker exception and the feared medical emergency exception.

The community caretaker exception arises from the duty of police officers to "ensure the safety and welfare of the citizenry at large." Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.4(c), at 201-02 (4th ed. 2004)).  It is clear from our review of the record that the officers involved in this case were motivated by a desire to serve and protect the Treasure Island community. And this court has held that "the operation of a methamphetamine lab is inherently dangerous, presents an immediate threat to public safety, and is well within the scope of the exigent circumstance exception." Barth v. State, 955 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). However, police community caretaker functions are "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).  And to justify entry under this exigency, the police must have a reasonable belief that a meth lab is being operated within a residence "based on their experience, facts developed during investigation, and observance of [the suspect's] activities."  Barth, 955 So. 2d at 1118. 

In this case, the officers who entered Fultz's home did not have any special training related to meth labs, had not conducted any investigation into the reports of possible drug activity in the home, and had not made any observations of the residents or their activities that morning. Prior to the warrantless entry, police had not conducted any surveillance or controlled drug buys, made contact with Fultz, or initiated any other investigation into the potential criminal activity or habits of Fultz.  Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the police did not have a reasonable belief that could justify a warrantless entry under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.

The feared medical emergency exception "permits police to enter and investigate private premises to preserve life . . . or render first aid, provided they do not enter with an accompanying intent either to arrest or search." Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280 (Fla. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Hornblower, 351 So. 2d at 718). This exigency recognizes that when there is a threat to safety and no time to secure a warrant, "the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justification for an otherwise invalid entry."  Vanslyke, 936 So. 2d at 1222 (quoting Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 279)).  However, the police must have an objectively reasonable fear that a medical emergency is occurring inside the residence.  See Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 281. 

                       The officers testified that the open door and the mail in the foyer coupled with their suspicions of an active meth lab led them to believe that someone inside had overdosed or was otherwise in need of immediate medical attention. The cases relied on by the State are distinguishable from the facts of this case because in each the officers' belief that there was an immediate need for their entry into the residence to address a medical emergency was based on more than just an open door, mail, and unconfirmed and uninvestigated reports of drug activity. See, e.g., State v. Shillingford, 136 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that exigent circumstances existed when officers summoned to investigate a domestic battery "arrived and observed [a] blood trail leading to [the defendant's] apartment[] and heard moaning coming from within the apartment"); Davis, 834 So. 2d 322 (holding that warrantless entry was lawful when a neighbor, who called police about a possible burglary, reported an open front door and the resident's dog was wandering outside and police observed signs of forced entry). In this case, the officers were not summoned to the residence for concerns regarding the residence or its occupants, did not see any blood or evidence of possible criminal activity, did not hear anything within the residence that would lead the officers to reasonably conclude that someone in the residence was in distress, and observed no signs of forced entry. The officers conducted no investigation into the unconfirmed reports of a meth lab on the premises and witnessed nothing consistent with the presence of a meth lab. There was nothing that could have led the officers to form an objectively reasonable belief that there was an ongoing medical emergency in the residence that required their immediate assistance.

 

We agree with the trial court that the Treasure Island Police Department's expressed policy of entering a home when they observe an open door and the residents fail to answer their hail is constitutionally troubling. There are many reasons that a citizen could leave a door to their home open; an open front door alone is not enough to support a reasonable belief that an exigency exists and cannot justify a warrantless entry into a residence.  See, e.g., Kyer v. Commonwealth, 612 S.E.2d 213, 217 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an open door on an August night absent some other reason for concern could not support a reasonable belief that would justify entry under the exigent circumstances doctrine); State v. Christenson, 45 P.3d 511, 513 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) ("[A]n open door on a summer morning is not, in and of itself, a circumstance that could give rise to a reasonable belief that entry is necessary to prevent harm to persons or property. It is simply too common an event to create a concern of harm in the absence of other signs of trouble."). Given Central Florida's temperate weather in November, an open door at 8:00 in the morning, without more, cannot justify a warrantless entry based on a feared medical emergency or the community caretaker function.  As explained in Hornblower, the police may not "approach a dwelling, armed only with their own subjective suspicion that illegal activity was afoot, and wait for some . . . justification to break down the door and burst into the dwelling."  351 So. 2d at 718.

Accordingly, we affirm the order granting the motion to suppress.

Affirmed.  

WALLACE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. 

Marijuana Search - Protective Safety Sweep

Marijuana Search
Protective Safety Sweep

Tampa Florida Criminal Defense Lawyer notes a recent Search and seizure case involving a Residence and a Search Warrant. The Second District Court ruled that the protective sweep of the possession of marijuana defendant's residence was improper. The court noted no basis for concern that drug evidence might be destroyed before a search warrant could be obtained.

Marijuana Search - Safety Sweep

The appeals court also found no facts to support a reasonable belief that there was a person in the residence who could pose a danger to law enforcement. The observation of narcotics by officers during an improper protective sweep cannot be a valid basis for issuance of search warrant, even so, since the officers smelled marijuana when the suspect opened front door after officers had lawfully approached residence and knocked on front door,  probable cause for issuance of warrant was found.

When the court finds that police unlawfully obtained some of evidence contained in an affidavit or application for a search warrant, the trial court must then determine if there was probable cause to support issuance of warrant based on any independent and lawfully obtained evidence. The trial court committed error in granting the  motion to suppress because probable cause for issuance of warrant was established without considering evidence obtained in improper protective sweep.

Case Excerpts:

"[T]he sweep of the house was improper based on the concern that evidence may be destroyed because there were no facts supporting an objectively reasonable basis for the belief that someone inside the house could destroy evidence while the warrant was being obtained. See United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1987) ("In determining whether the agents reasonably feared imminent destruction of the evidence, the appropriate inquiry is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured.")."

"[T]here was no evidence that the house was occupied, the trial court correctly found that the protective sweep of the house for officer safety was improper as there were no specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that there was an individual in the house who could pose a danger to law enforcement. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) ("The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.")."

"Where a court finds that police unlawfully obtained some of the evidence contained in the application for the 

search warrant, the court must then determine if there is probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant based on any independent and lawfully obtained evidence. Id. “[T]he court must excise the invalid allegations from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient valid allegations remain to support a finding of probable cause.” State v. Hood, 68 So. 3d 392, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)."

Source: STATE OF FLORIDA, v. IDALIA ROMAN Case No. 2D11-769 (Fla 2d DCA Nov. 7 2012).

Curtilage | No Search Warrant | Evidence Tossed

Drug Defense Attorney on Search

Criminal Defense Attorney reports a Search and seizure occurring after an illegal entry into a residential back yard has been invalidated by an appeals court. The area surroundind a home is known as the “Curtilage.” Sometimes cops claim Exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry. In this case, the trial court had denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a home.

Cops responded to an anonymous tip that there were 3 black males One reportedly had a handgun, was in front of home, next to a white sports utility vehicle. Additionally a tipster said there were possibly narcotics on the hood. The court noted the police did not have authority to enter the backyard of the home to investigate.

When officers arrived, they observed an SUV present in front of home, but there was no one matching description from tip and there was no indication that a crime had been, was being, or would be committed. Since entry into the backyard was improper, the judges ruled that evidence obtained as result of an illegal entry should be suppressed. The ruling tossing out the drugs seized was issued even though cops later observed drugs in the house through a broken window. After seeing the contraband the cops had conducted an illegal sweep of the home.

Case Excerpts:

“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and subject to only a few exceptions. Bryan relied on Coolidge v. New Hampshire to support his position that there must be an exigent circumstance that made a warrantless search “imperative.” 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). Exigent circumstances have been defined as “‘the sort of emergency or dangerous situation . . . that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.’” Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 2005). To rise to this level, the emergency must be so that it “‘makes a warrantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the community.’” Id. Safety is threatened when a need exists “‘to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury.’” Id. at 279.”

"Here, officers entered the curtilage of the home to investigate acting solely on an anonymous tip, only corroborated the tip to the extent that a white SUV was in front of the home, and had no indication from viewing the scene that a crime had been, was being, or would be committed. The officers were concerned that a gun and drugs were seen on the hood of the SUV, and there were children playing in the neighborhood, but when the officers arrived at the scene there did not appear to be anyone insight that may have a gun. The circumstances did not present a situation of exigent circumstances justifying intrusion into the curtilage of the house despite the fact that the SUV was parked in front. Because a warrantless search is unlawful when no exception applies and because the State did not prove through testimony or evidence that some reasonable belief of exigency existed, a warrant should have been obtained before police entry into Bryan’s backyard."

Source: 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1256a

No Search Warrant? Call Me Toll Free 1-877-793-9290.


View Drug Search Warrant Case Here for Free.

No Search Warrant Home 

Drug Dogs | Florida Tosses Search

Drug Dog Sniff Snuffed

Drug Charge Defense Attorney notes that Drug Dog Sniffs can be both a Search and an illegal seizure. The Florida Supreme Court just ruled on a Dog sniff at a residence. The case involved a Sniff test by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door of a private residence. The court ruled this is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Law enforcement must have probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion like courts have ruled in non-residential (car) cases.

Case Excerpt: "First, the dog “sniff test” that was conducted in the present case was an intrusive procedure. As explained more fully below, the “sniff test” was a sophisticated undertaking that was the end result of a sustained and coordinated effort by various law enforcement agencies. On the scene, the procedure involved multiple police vehicles, multiple law enforcement personnel, including narcotics detectives and other officers, and an experienced dog handler and trained drug detection dog engaged in a vigorous search effort on the front porch of the residence. Tactical law enforcement personnel from various government agencies, both state and federal, were on the scene for surveillance and backup purposes. The entire on-the-scene government activity—i.e., the preparation for the “sniff test,” the test itself, and the aftermath, which culminated in the full-blown search of Jardines‟ home—lasted for hours. The “sniff test” apparently took place in plain view of the general public."

The complete opinion is free here from Drug2Go.com.

Source: 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147a

Drug Dogs Search and Seizure

Drug Dogs | Search and Seizure | Traffic Stops

Drug Dogs and Traffic Stops

Drug Defense Attorney, Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer, W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary, Jr. has been researching drug dogs, drug dog sniffs, and traffic stops. One court recently made an interesting ruling that threw out cocaine seized after an extended traffic stop and subsequent drug dog sniff. Let's take a look at the decision.

The court became concerned after evidence of a prolonged delay after a traffic stop for speeding. The citation was written, but the cop held the driver for a drug dog to arrive. A Motion to Suppress cocaine was filed and denied by the trial court. The Appeals court reversed the decision finding that a drug dog alerted on the vehicle after the officer had detained defendant for almost thirty minutes before issuing citation. The court also found the search began after the traffic citation was issued and the purpose of the traffic stop was completed.

The law requires that without an ''articulable suspicion of criminal activity'' the time taken to issue a traffic citation can last no longer than necessary to make required license and registration checks and write a citation.  A completed traffic stop cannot be delayed or extended to set up and conduct a drug dog sniff search. The delay cannot even be de minimus, a fancy legal term for small or short.

Source: 35 Fla. L. Weekly D915a

Drug Dog Search Questions? Tell Me Your Story Toll Free 1-877-793-9290.

Drug Dogs - Search and Seizure - Traffic Stops

Tampa Federal Criminal Defense Attorney on Vehicle Search Seizure

Board Certified Tampa Federal Criminal Defense Attorney, W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary, reports a recent decision where The United States Supreme Court ruled: law enforcement can search passenger compartment of vehicle incident to recent occupant's arrest. But, only if it is reasonable to believe that arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The court further found that absent these justifications, search and seizure of defendant's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain warrant or show that another exception to warrant requirement exists. A State supreme court had correctly ruled that the case had involved unreasonable search where driver was arrested for driving on suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in patrol car BEFORE officers searched his car and found cocaine in a jacket pocket.

You can download and review the Court's opinion for free.

Source: 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S781a

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary, Jr. is available Toll Free to help with these types of allegations. 1-877-793-9290.


Federal Criminal Defense Attorney Tampa Florida on Vehicle Search Seizure